Cer­tichron SecureNTP Ope­nAPI project is launched

We have been sit­ting on this since RSA2010 where it became obvi­ous based on the evo­lu­tion and accep­tance of cloud com­put­ing mod­els that a new ref­er­ence time prac­tice was needed. One which used a less network-​​centric but still con­trolled and authen­ti­cated time-​​transfer process. To meet this need we decided that the best solu­tion was to enable the Appli­ca­tions them­selves to call a time-​​service provider as a run­time request and that for most oper­at­ing envi­ron­ments this just replaces the get­time(); ser­vice with a vari­ant which actu­ally calls the NTP ref­er­ence device for that security/​evidence gen­er­a­tion model.

And so to make this idea a valu­able resource we present the Ope­nAPI for NTP Ser­vices. The require­ments of the API are to pro­vide Secure SNTP style ser­vices using both IPC and Berke­ley socket based com­mu­ni­ca­tion mod­els for dis­trib­ut­ing time with the asso­ci­ated proof­ing prac­tices to force the cre­ation of those nec­es­sary records to fully doc­u­ment time-​​control on the entire chain-​​of-​​custody for any dig­i­tal object.  The intent is to cre­ate a more application-​​infrastructure based time-​​evidence model for reduc­ing risk and pro­vid­ing bet­ter assur­ance in the records cre­ated therein and in doing so to local­ize the time ser­vice request and response to the appli­ca­tion and not just read­ing it from an unprov­able reg­is­ter in the HOST OS.

Appli­ca­tion level NTP Client — for Appli­ca­tions not the OS!

The Ope­nAPI is then an inte­grated OS Time Of Day (TOD) ser­vice replace­ment which in a local­ized cloud envi­ron­ment allows the HOST or other spec­i­fied ref­er­ence device to sup­ply time ser­vices to the vir­tu­al­ized plat­form at the appli­ca­tion layer itself. This resource cre­ates an NTP time-​​evidence ser­vice set which is called at the appli­ca­tion level to pro­vide all NTP time set­ting and remote time-​​content stamp­ing facil­i­ties pro­vided in the NTP ser­vice only to appli­ca­tions rather than the appli­ca­tions them­selves rely­ing on the HOST OS.

• This new facil­ity pro­vides an unprece­dented level of secu­rity and integrity in appli­ca­tion level time stamp­ing ser­vices rather than rely­ing on the HOST OS, and thus asso­ci­at­ing trusted time-​​transfer processes (set­ting, cal­i­bra­tion, equal­iza­tion and attes­ta­tion) directly with the relying-​​party application.

• This unique new model allows the intro­duc­tion of mod­u­lar and secure sources of time com­plete with their  nec­es­sary evi­dence mod­els as resources in the pro­duc­tion of trans­par­ent busi­ness systems.

Secure Time is gen­er­ally the Source of all Prov­able Evi­dence in Computers!

Our rea­son­ing is that since net­work­ing espe­cially in tightly cou­pled clus­ters and Cloud Sys­tems mod­els is today accom­plished through very high-​​speed chan­nels and many of them through shared mem­ory and sem­a­phores as well as Secure IPC tools, the issues of Net­work Latency are not such an issue and the fore­front of the time con­trol prac­tice is to build reli­able proof mod­els which are light-​​weight yet strong enough to prove them­selves accu­rate in the most strin­gent appli­ca­tions and use models.

For more infor­ma­tion on how you can par­tic­i­pate in Ope­nAPI or how your prod­ucts can use the Ope­nAPI to bring secure time into them directly, please con­tact us at <font color=”#0000ff” face=“Times New Roman” size=“3”>OpenAPI@Certichron.COM</font> or call your Cer­tichron Sales per­son at 800−511−2301.

What you don’t know about Dig­i­tal Evi­dence can kill your business.

You never thought about it before but how you prove what you said you did on the com­puter sys­tems you accom­plish your busi­nesses work on is key to how much it costs to oper­ate your busi­ness. Infor­ma­tion Risk and Busi­ness Process Con­trol are becom­ing key fac­tors in man­ag­ing any and all risks in oper­at­ing an entity.

The world of an implied knowl­edge of infor­ma­tion secu­rity requirements

In today’s world where per­sonal infor­ma­tion is pro­tected by law and process con­trol integrity is man­dated by leg­isla­tive reg­u­la­tion, the processes through which the entity cre­ates endur­ing proof of its proper oper­a­tions are key to mak­ing informed business-​​centric deci­sions at all levels.

This was nowhere more dri­ven home than in Cal­i­for­nia State’s Khaled rul­ing that Red Light Cam­era sys­tems in place at the time of the rul­ing were hear-​​say evi­dence gen­er­a­tors mean­ing their very design was flawed. What they would need are processes which pro­vide the miss­ing pieces of exist­ing evi­dence mod­els which implies that most if not all of the sys­tems in place were not designed to com­ply with or oper­ate under today’s evi­dence requirements

Adding a new Evi­dence Com­pe­tence Step to Audit and Design Processes

To meet this new need, that means the addi­tion of an Evi­dence Strength and Facil­i­ta­tion Met­ric to all processes. That’s really just fancy talk for a process that eval­u­ates the math­e­mat­i­cal strength of the computer’s secu­rity and infor­ma­tion integrity con­trols to cre­ate a sim­ple Process Risk Coef­fi­cient, what we refer to as the PRC in the risk domain.

Com­puted ContinualCompliance

For those look­ing for a solu­tion for this Cer­tichron meets this need through its pro­pri­etary and patent applied for Con­tin­u­al­Com­pli­ance practice.

Con­tin­u­al­Com­pli­ance is a unique approach to data proof­ing and its adop­tion by an entity cre­ates a process where a reli­able set of Foren­sic Teleme­try &trade; is installed so that the busi­ness prac­tices being mon­i­tored prov­ably use the source of time for this time­stamp ser­vice model that is used to con­trol this process.

How this magic works is that every process a com­puter per­forms is dig­i­tal in nature so the idea that a secu­rity model can actu­ally be cre­ated which is com­puted based on con­tent and cer­ti­fied processes is a no-​​brainer. Its just never been done because of the size of the evi­dence cre­ated for each event case. But with today’s stor­age sys­tems being what they are this is no longer a hur­dle.  By cre­at­ing a set of uni­form time­stamps which tag and prove con­tent at stages the cor­rect­ness of any event thread can be “solved for com­plete­ness and cor­rect summing”.

How do I use this?

Certichron’s Con­tin­u­al­Com­pli­ance prac­tice process pro­vides a set of tools to insure key con­trol events are time­stamped through a part of the same evi­dence con­trol prac­tice the entity uses to set their time-​​of-​​day clocks and gen­er­ate their third-​​party evi­dence of proper track­ing of the time-​​of-​​day in their key sys­tems. The SecureNTP DES ser­vice from Cer­tichron is used in addi­tion to the SecureNTP server cal­i­bra­tion and infra­struc­ture con­trol ser­vice to prov­ably doc­u­ment an enti­ties proper syn­chro­niza­tion, end to end.
 
From a finan­cial or evi­dence stand­point Con­tin­u­al­Com­pli­ance cre­ates a com­pu­ta­tional model for rep­re­sent­ing any form of content-​​event sup­port­ing any and all mime types. What this means is that vir­tu­ally any type of ser­vice process can be instru­mented to pro­vide proper and end-​​to-​​end foren­sic ser­vices with the addi­tion of the Cer­tichron DES and SecureNTP DES ser­vice partnership. 

Con­tact us!

For more infor­ma­tion on how to imple­ment you own digital-​​evidence cen­tric prac­tice con­tact sales@​certichron.​com or call us at 800−511−2301.

SecureNTP DES for Cities™  and the vLEO™ Eval­u­a­tion Program

As a part of Certichron’s new vLEO work­ing group efforts Cer­tichron is pleased to announce the avail­abil­ity of DES for a 90 day trial period for Cities using secure time ser­vices as a new evi­dence anchor for the Law Enforce­ment and City Oper­a­tions ser­vices. 

SecureNTP for Cities program

SecureNTP for Cities profides a secure source of time for City IT Oper­a­tions which is prov­able. SecureNTP  for Cities pro­vides a City Man­ager with a secure source of time which is prov­able to the point of court admis­si­bil­ity. With this ser­vice the City Man­ager work­ing to pro­duce a court-​​admissible evi­dence work­flow will have the time-​​base trust anchor to prove the syn­chro­niza­tion of the local time ser­vice as well as any servers which peer­ing was setup for. 

SecureNTP with DES

Addi­tion­ally DES offers the City Man­ager the abil­ity to cre­ate their own Dig­i­tal Evi­dence Pol­icy and IT Prac­tice for its cre­ation in the form of NTP based content-​​timestamps. Most IT peo­ple are unaware that NTP has two optional pay­loads which can be used to carry addi­tional hashes which can be used to rep­re­sent events in time. Certichron’s SecureNTP DES does exactly this and allows for the time-​​stamping and archival stor­age through the Peer­ing Pro­gram com­po­nent of SecureNTP. 

DES pro­vides its adopters an unprece­dented Audit and Evi­dence Prac­tice Enablement

This capa­bil­ity allows a City Man­ager and IT Direc­tor to pro­vide a Time-​​stamping prac­tice which can be used like a Cash Reg­is­ter Receipt only one which can con­tain any num­ber of event or prac­tice types. The ser­vice is an audit design­ers dream because they can cre­ate third-​​party time­stamps which are prov­ably cre­ated through the use of the NIST(UTC) time stan­dard itself. No other time man­age­ment and evi­dence creation/​management process offers this level of capability.

DES for Cities is a new pro­gram to imple­ment new dig­i­tal evi­dence prac­tices atop exist­ing and emerg­ing city-​​operations work flows. This key prac­tice adds sup­port­ing value to exist­ing work flows and can be used as the basis of a vir­tual Law Enforce­ment Oper­a­tions (vLEO) sys­tem. 

vLEO and Law Enforce­ment or Court Practices

vLEO uses Certichron’s patent applied for OpenTDI and Cer­e­monies in Soft­ware™ process which allows for the vir­tu­al­iza­tion of a Law Enforce­ment Officer’s com­mis­sion through the NCCSL eNo­tary Pro­vi­sions now on the books in all fifty states. If your Cam­era Sys­tem or Red­light Ser­vice is down now, this vLEO ser­vice may be just what you need.  Call Cer­tichron at 800−511−2301 or email us at Sales@​Certichron.​COM

Certichron’s lat­est Las Vegas site is com­ple­mented by a new twin-​​site open­ing in the State of New Jer­sey.

Certichron’s new Las Vegas site is com­ple­mented by a the dual-​​purpose New Jer­sey site as both ser­vice for their local gam­ing com­mu­ni­ties and the NYSE oper­a­tions now com­ing online in New Jer­sey proper. The New Jer­sey Site also serves as crit­i­cal fail-​​over for Certichron’s heav­ily used NYC tim­ing ser­vice center!

    Cer­tichron is expand­ing with part­ner New York Inter­net  into their newly-​​opened Bridge­port New Jer­sey oper­a­tions center. Certichron’s selec­tion of the  Bridge­port site for NYC fail–over ser­vices is there to pro­vide a legal time-​​reference backup to the Secu­ri­ties and Finan­cial Indus­try who use the NYC time server.

Casino’s and Sur­veil­lance Clients

Casi­nos’ com­ply­ing with Nevada Gam­ing Code 9.060(b) are pleasently sur­prised the same ser­vice which sat­isfy time ser­vice man­dates in sur­veil­lance sys­tems also meet their PCI DSS 10.4 com­pli­ance require­ments seam­lessly. SecureNTP and NIST(UTC) cer­ti­fi­ca­tion are the absolute best source of time anywhere.

SEC com­pli­ance

Certichron’s time-​​solution ser­vice called SecureNTP also works to man­age dis­trib­uted event sychro­niza­tion across any num­ber of sys­tems and loca­tions mean­ing it is FINRA listed as a OATS 7430 (time ser­vices for trad­ing) com­pli­ance solution.

Fur­ther expansion

Certichron’s Regional Time Cen­ter oper­a­tions frame­work is also expand­ing into the South­east with planned oper­a­tions in Atlanta, Dal­las, and Miami, and plans Inter­na­tional Tim­ing Ser­vice Cen­ters to sat­isfy the need in Europe and Asia alike.

For infor­ma­tion on use of the New Jer­sey or Las Vegas tim­ing cen­ters and the facil­i­ties they pro­vide con­tact sales@cer­tichron.com or call us directly at 800−511−2301  . 

In direct oppo­si­tion to the DoD Ban on unen­cryupted GPS for any offi­cial pur­pose beca­sue of its spoofa­bil­ity and lack of secu­rity, the Mass­a­chu­setts State Supreme Judi­cial Court ruled that GPS data from a 2004 case is reli­able evi­dence for prosecution.

• http://​www​.salem​news​.com/​l​o​c​a​l​/​x​1​7​0​3​9​4​6​8​4​2​/​C​o​u​r​t​-​r​u​l​e​s​-​G​P​S​-​e​v​i​d​e​n​c​e​-​i​s​-​a​d​m​i​s​s​i​ble

The Court’s response was: “Our pre­em­i­nent con­cern with respect to the evi­dence pre­sented and con­sid­ered at revo­ca­tion pro­ceed­ings is its reli­a­bil­ity,” Jus­tice Robert Cordy wrote in the deci­sion. “If the evi­dence is admis­si­ble under stan­dard evi­den­tiary rules, it is pre­sump­tively reli­able. If it is not admis­si­ble under such rules, a judge must inde­pen­dently eval­u­ate its reli­a­bil­ity.” That makes sense since the data was cap­tured in 2004 but later in this response will will point out that the DoD banned the use of L1 GPS in 1998, so even in 2004 it was known how inse­cure GPS data reports were. There is also another issue this rul­ing cre­ates and that is the Couurt’s set­ting prece­dents which per­tain to tech­nol­ogy which is now no longer secure. In 2010 (today) this rul­ing per­tains to an event which hap­pened in 2004, and since then the tech­no­log­i­cal basis of GPS secu­rity mod­els has changed, it is no longer as secure as it was in 2004. The prob­lem we are con­cerned with is then that this 2010 rul­ing paves the way for more par­ties to side­step tech­nol­ogy changes and read­ily avail­able infor­ma­tion in the hacker and gen­eral access com­mu­ni­ties. As such the rul­ing is dan­ger­ous in my opin­ion, and as to why read on…

Joint Chiefs of Staff ban GPS L1 use in 1998

With the ver­i­fi­ca­tion of the GPS data admis­si­bil­ity, what the court didn’t review was that the offi­cial Fed­eral Pol­icy from the DoD on the use of L1 GPS or that of the DoE. In fact the DoD banned the use of the un-​​encrypted GPS ser­vices in 1998 and that was never fac­tored into the Court’s deci­sion. The 1998 order of the Joint Chiefs forces all Mil­i­tary users of GPS to switch to the SAASM encrypted ser­vice or L2 GPS which has its own secu­rity. It was delayed to Octo­ber 1^st 2006 as to its effec­tive date but the DoD pol­icy about stan­dard posi­tion­ing sys­tem use with­out SAASM was in fact set in 1998 mean­ing that every­one in the DoD and the real world of the Gov­ern­ment itself knows about these liabilities.

The DoE also has spe­cific guid­ance on the lia­bil­i­ties and has staged actions with the FBI to hijack GPS tracked vehi­cles to doc­u­ment the secu­rity lia­bil­i­ties of GPS Data. That the Court refused to review this vio­lated the Sua Sponte respon­si­bil­ity the Court has to deter­mine fact and in this rul­ing is effec­tively rewrit­ing Physics Texts to side­step the fact that whether they rename RED as BLUE, it still will be RED.

Searches — do the diligence

Try this GOOGLE Search and notice every­one talk­ing about the SAASM Man­date from the Joint Chiefs (JCoS), this is the most heav­ily guarded ‘secret’ from the pub­lic and it is the GPS Indus­try which will loose bil­lions of dol­lars of profit if the truth about the GPS sys­tems lia­bil­i­ties for trust-​​transfer are reviewed with regard to its inabil­ity to cre­ate reli­able evi­dence is found out… don’t believe me — do the searches here.

SAASM Man­date

The JCoS order that “no unen­crypted GPS L1 Sys­tems will be pur­chased because of their lack of secu­rity and spoofability/​jamming ease” can be seen all over the GPS world:

• http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&rls=com.microsoft%3Aen-us%3AIE-SearchBox&q=joint+chiefs+SAASM+mandate&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs_rfai=
• US DoE offi­cial GPS Vul­ner­a­bil­ity Assess­ment Team at LANL: http://www.né.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/spoof.html
• Finan­cial aspects of GPS reliance: http://​philose​cu​rity​.org/​2​0​0​8​/​0​9​/​1​1​/​g​p​s​-​a​n​d​-​w​a​l​l​-​s​t​r​eet
• Arti­cle on Jon Warner’s GPS tracked “Gaso­line Truck Hijack­ing” which is spe­cific to this case and the use of GPS in any vehi­cle track­ing require­ment: http://​philose​cu​rity​.org/​2​0​0​8​/​0​9​/​0​7​/​g​p​s​-​s​p​o​o​f​ing

.

GPS and Cel­lu­lar Jammers

Based on the tons of well known data, the Supreme Judi­cial Court in its GPS rul­ing failed to take actual real evi­dence into account and doc­u­mented its fail­ing as an objec­tive forum. The physics of the issue are well known and very well doc­u­mented. The L1 GPS sys­tem can be shut­down from a ground-​​station per­spec­tive with about $20 in parts. Addi­tion­ally today there are com­mer­cial jam­mers avail­able as off the shelf devices from mul­ti­ple vendors

US Coast Guard warn­ing about Tandy/​Radio Shack and other TV Ampli­fiers in response to a GPS out­age for all of Moss Land­ing (a Mon­terey Cal­i­for­nia sub­urb) for 37 cal­en­dar days. The ampli­fier is $20… the area blacked out by this device was about a kilo­me­ter and a half wide cir­cle mean­ing any GPS device stay­ing into that area would be dead while it was inside that area http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg3/cg3pcx/publications/alcoast/alcoast-298–03.asp

Spoof­ing L1 GPS Sys­tems such that any records are cre­at­able as needed costs only mar­gin­ally more.

As a demon­stra­tion of how bad GPS is as a source of Court Admis­si­ble evi­dence we took a stan­dard offender track­ing bracelet and showed how with sim­ple equip­ment avail­able through a Google Search, that bracelet could be jammed. The Judge we actu­ally per­formed this for stood there as the blood drained from his face as he real­ized that the evi­dence model they present is use­less. We took it a step far­ther and then showed him what could be done with a GPS Test/​Simulator Appa­ra­tus like a LAB­SAT (http://​lab​sat​.co​.uk/) sys­tem from Race Logic. What came to this Jurist was that evi­dence could be fab­ri­cated through the use of GPS L1 sys­tems and that they were unac­cept­able for use in any key crit­i­cal appli­ca­tions such as the track­ing of cer­tain high-​​risk parties.

In clos­ing: What to do about the situation

The real­ity is that any­one with a LAB­SAT and six of those $20 ampli­fiers can make a L1 GPS sys­tem say any­thing they want it to… mak­ing it an unac­cept­able source of evi­dence for courts. From our per­spec­tive it is not too late for the Court to review the actual evi­dence about the physics of GPS and the evi­dence GPS based appli­ance sys­tems cre­ate, and if so war­ranted to reverse itself based on its finally review­ing the tons of evi­dence out there. We feel the data clearly proves that the GPS L1 Sys­tem is now nei­ther reli­able (from a “Evi­dence Sense”) or trust-​​able with­out other over­sight con­trol­ling that trust. In clos­ing if GPS is used for human over­sight based nav­i­ga­tion appli­ca­tions, it is won­der­ful but because of how eas­ily the data model is manip­u­lated this is not a source of infor­ma­tion which could be court admis­si­ble with­out sec­ondary con­firm­ing information.

Rogue Radio Shack $20 TV Ampli­fier takes Moss Land­ing GPS Ser­vices out for 37 days.

In early 2001 a rogue TV Ampli­fier on a sail­boat in the Moss land­ing har­bor was left turned on and because of a prob­lem with the antenna lead became a source of GPS inter­fer­ence in Moss Land­ing Cal­i­for­nia. The out­age was so dra­matic it caused the US Coast Guard to issue spe­cific guid­ance on the use of the low-​​cost “pow­ered TV ampli­fiers” since they can become radi­a­tors of broad-​​spectrum inter­fer­ence which takes GPS down hard.. This GPS Ser­vice out­age also caused sev­eral research vessel’s IT teams to snap into action, but the bad news is that with all that brain-​​power it still took a month to solve mean­ing that “GPS Out­ages are com­plex to ana­lyze and very easy to cause”. The evi­dence spe­cific impli­ca­tions of this are self-​​evident.

GPS as a source of trustable time for Smart­Grid or Red­Lightr Cam­era Operations?

Think what an out­age of this type would do to a GPS based smart­grid or red­light cam­era based appli­ca­tion.  In fact for that mat­ter think of that since GPS is unprov­able as a legally prov­able source of evi­dence of any­thing. Whether it works cor­rectly most of the time is not the issue, the issue is whether for the pur­poses of a law enforce­ment prac­trice or legal mat­ter whether some­thing with known lia­bil­i­ties and eas­ily dis­rupted ser­vices pro­vides a reli­able enough solu­tion for trust processes as an “Anchor for treat­ing portable trust” services.

• For infor­ma­tion on the search for the jam­ming source see the GPSWorld arti­cle at http://​www​.gpsworld​.com/​g​n​s​s​-​s​y​s​t​e​m​/​s​i​g​n​a​l​-​p​r​o​c​e​s​s​i​n​g​/​t​h​e​-​h​u​n​t​-​r​f​i​-​776

A local copy of the USCG Notice page can be seen at:

• USCG Report on TV Amplifiers

Police and Sheriff’s Depart­ments have a new hur­dle to leap and that is in meet­ing the new con­straints Khaled placed against their exist­ing evi­dence cap­ture and man­age­ment prac­tices

To make it pos­si­ble for Law Enforce­ment (LE) to pro­tect our cul­ture and to deal with the ris­ing costs of insur­ing that secu­rity Law Enforce­ment processes are turn­ing to both out­sourced or remotely oper­ated sur­veil­lance sys­tems which depend on vir­tu­al­iza­tion of inter­nal LE and many of the field-​​based LE Data Cap­ture Oper­a­tions which would ulti­mately lead to some form of pros­e­cu­tion and settlement-​​fine.

Tra­di­tional Evi­dence has been first-​​person in form

Tra­di­tion­ally in these mat­ters any cita­tions issued through those processes would gen­er­ally need to be issued by the Police Offi­cer or Sheriff’s Deputy who was oper­at­ing that sys­tem under the com­mis­sion of their office as a law enforce­ment offi­cer. Some States actu­ally have law lim­it­ing the issuance of cita­tions to requir­ing the office of a com­mis­sioned Law Enforce­ment Offi­cer to issue which com­pli­cates many sur­veil­lance and auto­mated traf­fic man­age­ment practices.

Certichron’s “Cer­e­monies in Soft­ware” allows for the vir­tu­al­iza­tion of Law Enforce­ment Functionality

Certichron’s Vir­tu­al­ized Law Enforce­ment Offi­cer, a Cer­e­mony in Soft­ware Prac­tice based on already-​​approved eNo­tary prac­tice addresses this require­ment fully mean­ing with Certichron’s sys­tem exist­ing Law Enforce­ment Agen­cies are ‘good-​​to-​​go’ to restart their traf­fic enforce­ment prac­tices immediately.

The use of the Notary statures ampli­fy­ing the Law Enforce­ment com­mis­sion cre­ates a new and pow­er­ful elec­tronic sign­ing resource with the inte­grated $15,000 bond all nota­rized sign­ings cre­ate. This sys­tem fully meets Cal­i­for­nia and other State require­ments since these states already rat­i­fied the spe­cific por­tions of the Notary Prac­tices Act’s as UCC mak­ing the Cer­tichron model already approved for roll­out across all 50 states.

In fact with proper imple­men­ta­tion of a new evidence-​​capture mind­set, many if not all exist­ing sys­tems can be brought into align­ment with the new con­trol require­ments to main­tain their admis­si­bil­ity into US and Cal­i­for­nia Courts.

The Vir­tu­al­ized LEO

The vir­tiual­ized LEO allows for Inten­tional Evi­dence from each stage of each process to be cre­ated under the com­mis­sion of the offi­cer attest­ing to the issuance of the cita­tions. The cap­ture of the data can be cer­ti­fied by adding a hash­ing time­stamp for each event. The report­ing or con­tain­ment receipt can be prop­erly acknowl­edged with a time­stamp request show­ing each com­po­nent move­ment of evi­dence con­tent, and when that con­tent is ephemeral in form this is the only way to prop­erly doc­u­ment con­trolled man­age­ment of that data.

With this sys­tem any exist­ing sys­tem can have trans­parency and the cer­ti­fy­ing process added to the process by the LEO sign­ing into the Ses­sion Man­ager and attest­ing that they are apply­ing their com­mis­sion as a LEO to that oper­at­ing ses­sion. The prac­tice also can be facil­i­tated against the Cam­era Oper­a­tions Mod­els today for any and all sys­tems (Red­Flex and Lock­heed, or ATS oper­ated in form). For all of these con­trol prac­tices the Cer­tichron DES infra­struc­ture allows the cre­ation and appli­ca­tion of the human com­mis­sion in a vir­tual sense
to these exist­ing systems.

For more infor­ma­tion on our ser­vices and tech­nolo­gies, please email Cer­tichron with your require­ments or con­tact the sales office directly at 800−511−2301 (9−5 PST). Cer­tichron, Inc. © 2009, 2010

The Khaled rul­ing has unique impact on Orange County busi­nesses and campus-​​security oper­a­tions for com­mer­cial, med­ical and edu­ca­tional cen­ter operators.

The issues with the cre­ation and man­age­ment of trust­wor­thy sur­veil­lance data is directly an issue with Orange County courts mean­ing now to reduce risk, oper­at­ing groups need to cre­ate reli­able evi­dence of their actions.

Most processes which only include two par­ties are inher­ently weak, those with a trusted third party. Now there is a real require­ment to cre­ate the Trust­wor­thi­ness of the Dig­i­tal Evi­dence they in all sys­tems cap­tur­ing or con­tain­ing it for the Risk Mit­i­ga­tion Model that allows those enti­ties to obtain insur­ance for their operations.

Certichron’s SecureNTP and the DES time­stamp­ing tech­nol­ogy is exactly what the doc­tor ordered in that it allows a law enforce­ment or civic oper­a­tor to pro­vide court admis­si­ble evi­dence. Adding DES with its SecureNTP com­pletely meets the exist­ing require­ments and when cou­pled with our Cer­e­monies in Soft­ware ser­vice model, can set up a notar­ial con­trol ser­vice on Red­Light Cam­era and other sys­tems designed to auto­mate law enforce­ment activities.